Winning the psywar in Colombia by Moore, Tyler K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2001-07
Winning the psywar in Colombia
Moore, Tyler K.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/15403











Center for the .Study of


























The international press has spent the last decade - and longer - criticizing u.s. efforts to make
positiveprogress in their vvar on the Colombian drug trade. It surprises no one then, that magazines and
newspapers around the globe are swollen "With articles attacking Plan Colombia, the latest step in our
nation's effort to promote stability and security in our southern neighbor. Calling it a "Plan de Muerte" -
a Plan of Death - press members have leveled accusations of alleged GOC support of vigilante groups,
indiscriminate spraying of herbicides near populated areas, and U.S. support for a military "With an
atrocious record of human rights abuses. If these accusations are true, then we as a nation must seriously
consider howmuch support we should rightfully provide to the hemispheres primary supplier of illicit
drugs. But before we succumb to Dante's advice and "abandon all hope", a serious question begs an
answer: Is the United States committing avast portion of its fOJ;eign aid to a corrupt government, or has
theworld at large been effectively deceived by one of the most effective psychological warfare campaigns
in history?
Some military theorists argue that in the information age, war will beless lethal because
information,savvy forces will be able to paralyze their opponents "Without physical conflict. Although at
first glanceit seems inappropriate to assert this could possiblybe the case in Colombia, a study of the
results of the FARCs campaign against the Colombian government suggest othervvise. With minimal use
of armed force, the FARC have secured their own internationally recognized homeland, "Farclandina",
eliminated a significant portion of their opposition's leadership, and inflamed public opinion in both the
United States and Colombia against U.S. involvement there. Through theuse of its Public Affairs arm, the
FARC are "Winning what we might call the "Battle of the Story". That is, the side that constructs the most
convincing story, truthful or not, will enjoy the considerable benefit of positivepublic support for their
operations. Regardless of what you call it, the FARC are clearly winning this fight. Especially over the
past decade, the FARC have managed to "Win both political and economic support by controlling the
story presented to the public.
As a side note, in many of these examples, the FARC will be equally guilty of the crimes they
level against their opponents, although this fact often seems lost on the majority of the public - a tribute
to thepower of information.
In The ArtafWar, Sun Tzu recommends that rather than attacking the enemy's forces in the field,
amilitary is better served by attackinghis strategy. Psychological warfare can be a powerful weapon to
this end, and the FARC have made the leadership of the Colombian military aprincipal strategic target.
The FARC has, over the course of the last several years, focused on attacking the human rights record of
the Colombian military. Their most successful tactic recendy has been to accuse Colombian military
leaders of supporting the paramilitaries (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AVC) in their attacks
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against suspectedguerillas and guerilla sympathizersl . Whileplacing the Colombian military's leadership
on the defensive, they simultaneouslydemandjusticefrom the government, thus playing their adversaries
against each other. The FARC risks nothing, while weakening the already strained relationship betWeen
the Colombian government and military.
This tactic has been extremely successful in removing a number of general officers and other
high~rankingofficials from the Ministry of Defense2, while painfullydrawing out the vetting process and
stifling u.s. efforts to train and equip the Colombian military.
In the midst of this turmoil, the FARC continues to use its "revolutionary army" to violate human
rights across the country, including kidnappings, murders, car bombings, and narco-trafficking, often on
the backs of child~soldiers they regularly press into service3•
The average non~Colombian woqld be hard pressed to guess howmany FARC attacks took place
during the year 2000 (approximately100) or howmanypolice and military were captured and killed
(approximately 330 captured, over 300 killed)4. However, every time the paramilitary forces commit an
execution, the guerrilla publicity machine fires out a series of scathing reports about the attack and
accuses the military of supporting the operation. 1his tactic continues to be successful despite President
Pastrana's efforts to prosecute paramilitary militias, and especially any of their Colombian military
supporters.
Thepropaganda campaign against the spraying of coca plantations forms another pillar in the
FARes psychological campaign against the GOC and its Northern allies. Knowing that 60% of their
income derives from the narcotics trades, the FARC holds an obvious stake in the U.sJColombian coca~
spraying program. The FARC has stirred opposition against spraying among the rural farmers since the
program's inception. They have convinced the campesinos that the spraying would not only permanendy
cripple the productivity of their fields and poison their families, but that the crop substitution programs
will not pay them well enough to survive. This campaign has netted the FARC strong support in rural
Colombia, especially since any farmers that oppose the FARC, refuse to grow coca, or indicate interest in
crop substitution join the ranks of the "desaparecidos"6, and someone that will grow coca takes over the
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farm. The FARC have even persuaded the NGOs that visit the DMZ that the government is spraying
legitimate crops, and that the rashes on the peasant children are from the chemicals deployed by crop~
dusters rather than from indigenous plants and insects. In more recent fallout from this campaign, the
governors of four of the southern Colombian States toured Washington to criticize the spraying
campaigll. Again, while attacking their adversary on one front, the FARC perpetuate hypocrisy on
another. FARC leaders condemn the spraying campaign with myth and rumor, crying out on behalf of the
peasants and the environment, while at the same time using more concentrated versions of the same
chemical sprayed from the aircraft to control the weeds in their coca plantations. Experts estimate the
FARC puts six times the amount of herbicide into the ground over the course of a crop than the
government doess. Still, the guerrillas, along with environmentalist NGOs accuse the government of
polluting the environment. In the meantime, no one seems to have noticed that the rivers in Colombia's
rainforests are dead or dying from the dumping of precursor chemicals like gasoline and hydrochloric
acid (used in the production of coca~paste)by the FARC. Indeed, you are more likely to find members of
the international community who believe the FARC accusations that the United States is spraying
Colombia with anthrax and other biological and chemical agents than environmentalists raging against
the FARCs almost single~handeddestruction of the rain forests in Colombia. In light of these examples,
it is easy to see that the Colombian leadership has been so outclassed in this information war. How could
f they possibly be so badly beaten by such a hypocritical opponent? And more importantly, how do we
turn the tide in this battle before it's too late? The keywill be the implementation of an information
strategy that puts the Colombian government and military on the offensive rather than the defensive.
To this end, the United States has contracted with the Rendon Group to help the Colombian
government overcome their slow start in the Psywar against the FARC with a potent PR strategy. The
Rendon Group has been providing public relations consulting to various groups since the Gulf War.
They are working to implement a public affairs strategy with the Colombian military that will allow
them to fight with at least equal footing against the FARC in the psychological -warfare arena The
Group's first task involved the difficult task of forging a joint public relations team from amongst the
military services9• Inter-service rivalry has been a divisive factor within the Colombian Ministry of
Defense for some time. Competition for scarce assets has kept joint efforts to a minimum in the past. The
joint PA team represents another step taken by the MINDEF to promote cohesion between the Army,
Navy and Air Force. It's successful formation has resulted in coordinated press releases by the services,
reduced the amount of negative press the military receives, and will provide the cornerstone of a
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successful image improvement campaign. With the services finally working together on what story to
provide to the public, the Rendon Group is nowfocusing on teaching them when to provide it, howto
tell it, who to tell it to, and howoften to repeat itlO• For example, if the FARC complains of the spraying
ofchildren with pesticides, the Colombian military cannot (as it has done in the past) wait up to 3days
to counter the accusations of the guerrillas. The military must provide a convincing counter'argument on
the same day. Even better, if the story is released later in the day, the prO'Colombian story can run in the
press over a two day period, expanding the amount of air time the story receives. And the story can't be a
simple categorical denial of the guerrillas' assertions. The public needs to be told that the incident either
didn't happen, has been exaggerated, or comes from a completely incredible source. Credible medical
references to the government's story should be offered to the public, along with an appropriate sprinkling
of other details that make a story believable to the public. The Rendon Group will also be encouraging
the COLMIL to get their "stories" out to the press before the FARC issues press releases on the same
topicsll. The second storywill almost always be perceived as being reactive to the first story, making the
teller look defensive and less credible. The Rendon Group will also be encouraging the MINDEF to
control press access to key military officials. Currently, the press can roam the CAN (Colombian
Pentagon) almost at will, ambushinggenerals with questions they are not prepared to answer, and
making the military leadership look·rather incompetent. Although this is certainly not the case, the
resulting image is the only one the public sees, and the FARC does nothing to discourage it. By
scheduling regular press conferences and preparing the leadership involved with the appropriate facts
beforehand, the military could take major steps forward in improving their public image. Certainly, the
RendonGroup consultants in Bogota have their work cut out for them, but the battle is only beginning.
Even as we speak, key issues are stewing in the public mind, and the MINDEF needs to do its
part to make sure the public sees the "right" side of the story. These situations include the prisoner
exchange talks and the continued extensions of the FARCs DMZ. On a broader scale, the entire peace
process strategy needs to be more clearly communicated to the public - and with a favorable light on the
government's image.
Successfully spinning these stories may be the first real obstacle the new Public Affairs team
faces. From agrand strategic perspective, however, the problem must be dealt with cooperatively by all
the major pieces of the national government. If the military and political leadership can get their story to
the press in acoordinated fashion along theguidelines established by the Rendon Group consultants,
perhaps the tide of the psychological war in Colombia can be changed after all.
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